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Abstract 
In this short paper I critically analyze Marc Leman’s embodied approach to musical mean-
ing and representation, suggesting that its explanatory value is not sufficient in order to be 
a good alternative for theories encompassing the concept of representation. 
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Researchers operating in the paradigm of embodied cognition since recently have become 
interested in the explanation of the phenomena of musical cognition, musical experience 
or musical perception. Several ideas were proposed (among the most influential, Leman, 
2010), being centered around the thesis that (1) music is perceived by the whole body, not 
only by the brain or the mind. In other words, (musical) agents are not only minds, or 
minds reduced to brains, or simply brains, but whole bodies. The idea that music is per-
ceived by the body does not seem controversial, given the understanding of musical phe-
nomena as simply physical waves which approach the listener, causing bodily changes 
(eardrums, blood pressure, heartbeat). What seems to be controversial, however, is that 
the thesis (1), let us call it the Embodied Music Perception Thesis, entails—what seems to 
be stronger epistemically—the thesis that (2) only (or predominantly) studies of bodily 
reactions to (and interactions with) music can help us understand how music cognition 
works. Let us call the latter the Embodied Music Cognition Explanation Thesis. While 
understanding the importance of the research on body-music interaction and in agreement 
with (1), I am going to state a few questions about (2), taking the problem of musical 
meaning as a working example.  
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1. The Importance of the Body in Music Listening, and Why It Is Not the Case Here  
Let us be clear: without the body, music seems to be impossible. We play musical instru-
ments with our fingers, hands and legs, we perceive music with our bodies, we communi-
cate with music, we dance, we express the feeling of rhythm by clapping, shaking heads, 
etc. As music is a strictly human phenomenon (music understood as a temporal, dynamical 
structure, described by such qualities as melody, harmony, rhythm etc.), being universal 
among cultures and used in social or religious contexts, it simply has to be of huge im-
portance to acknowledge that the body plays a role when we want to speak about music 
perception. Movement caused (or rather correlated, in the embodied paradigm) by listen-
ing to music, like tapping the feet, helps to organize time, and actually influences the per-
ception of time. Every musician knows how bodily movements help to keep the rhythm 
and cooperate while playing in a band. It is enough to think about the conductor of a sym-
phony orchestra, who, literally, expresses certain qualities of music by bodily movement, 
albeit with a specific code.  
Plenty of research in cognitive sciences of music has supplied a huge body of evidence for 
the thesis of the influence of the body on music perception, and vice versa (e.g. Maes, 2013; 
Banerjee, 2015; overview in Hodges, 2009). This seems to be beyond dispute. The prob-
lems start when we try to involve body-music interaction descriptions in the explanation of 
how music cognition works. It seems that the difference between descriptive and explana-
tory functions of a theory is not often clear. I am trying to argue here that while Leman’s 
views on music could be seen as important from the descriptive point of view, i.e. providing 
a good description and illustration of the importance of the body in music perception, they 
lack explanatory power when it comes to the problem of musical meaning, the explanatory 
power provided, by contrast, by the rival paradigms (e.g., cognitive neuroscience). 
The fact that listening to fast-beat music is correlated with a faster hart rate, or galvanic 
skin response, or just movement, does not explain directly how changes in tempo influence 
our thinking about a given piece of music, i. e. how the content of musical representation 
(or musical meaning) is determined. One could eliminate the concept of cognition and 
thinking as processing referential representations, bringing in the idea of 'spatio-temporal 
representations’. Spatio-temporal representations are a very useful tool to explain the role 
of rhythm, gesture, or tempo changes (Naveda and Leman, 2010). It seems to be unclear, 
however, how incorporating the idea of spatio-temporal representation in a model of musi-
cal cognition could help to understand how, for example, complicated harmonies interfere, 
producing an impression of a specific musical meaning, or, if not a meaning, at least a form.  
 
2. The Classical Problem of Musical Meaning 
The classical philosophical problem of musical meaning, unsurprisingly, has its roots in 
ancient Greek philosophy. To put it shortly, the problem consists of three—basic—ques-
tions: (Q.1) Does music have a meaning? If yes (Q2) what is that meaning or rather (Q3) 
what does “meaning” in this case mean? For the purpose of this paper, it is enough to 
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briefly mention the traditional views of (1) emotivism (e.g., Schopenhauer 2011), (2) lin-
guistic paradigm (e.g., Langer, 1979) and (3) formalism (e.g., Hanslick, 1986). According 
to (1) music: (a) contains emotions, (b) refers to emotions or (c) evokes emotions. Accord-
ing to (2) music can be understood as a language (with, obviously, syntax and, more con-
troversially, semantics) or as a sign system somehow “similar” to language. Formalism 
(3) is a view according to which it is impossible for music to have any meaning as its 
“understanding” consists purely in the recognition of its form or structure. As it can be 
seen (1) and (2) do not have to be contradictory. Another specific concept of music comes 
from the Sophists who claimed that music does not convey any meaning; neither do we 
listen to music because of its form. Rather, the reason why humans are interested in music 
is strictly physical (or, more precisely, biological) pleasure.  
Contemporary philosophical discussion is still lively, being concentrated mostly around the 
emotional (expressive) meaning of music (e.g., Kivy, 1990; Davies, 1994), although the 
results of research on the, broadly understood, cognitive science grounds are more and more 
often used in attempts to answer the traditional philosophical questions (e.g., Vempala and 
Russo, 2013, and, from the point of view of cognitive neuroscience, Koelsh, 2013). 
This brings us to the cognitive aesthetics of music. Research in cognitive neuroscience, 
cognitive psychology and evolutionary psychology has been brought into philosophical 
discussion by some philosophers (e.g., Nussbaum, 2007), and, on the other hand, some 
philosophical theories were applied as models in the sciences mentioned above. This sit-
uation caused a vast methodological confusion in the field and calls for some form of 
categorization. In the first group mentioned above, analogically to other problems in the 
philosophy of mind, we could, generally, distinguish two possible attitudes: reductive and 
eliminativist. The reductive approach would focus on the application of findings from em-
pirical sciences to old philosophical problems, showing that science can adequately ex-
plain problems such as musical meaning, representation or beauty. What follows is that 
musical meaning would be reduced from an experience, representation or other mental 
objects to, for example, a specific neural reaction of the brain (in neuroscience) or a real-
ization of an evolutionary strategy (in evolutionary psychology). If one would like to go 
through the reduction process, one should define bridge laws to be applied when reducing 
certain levels and provide an applicable theory of explanation. 
The eliminativist approach, on the other hand, would focus on the conviction that the old-
fashioned philosophical (or folk-psychological) concept of musical meaning is roughly 
meaningless and actually harmful for the development of science. Proponents of this atti-
tude would “eliminate” philosophical notions of musical meaning or representation (in the 
manner of Churchland, 1981) and would talk instead (usually on the grounds of neurosci-
ence) of brain structures and, at best, brain functions. It does not seem to be clear which 
attitude—reductive or eliminative—would be more consistent with the embodied para-
digm. Is the embodied approach reductive or eliminative and, if neither, what is it? 
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3. The Embodied Approach to Representation 
Now, let us have a closer look at the proposed model of representation in the embodied 
paradigm. In the article “An Embodied Approach to Music Semantics” (2010) Marc 
Leman proposes a view in which the embodied approach to musical representation needs 
to encompass a broader look at semantics in general. The author lists classical views on 
semantics (representational, causal, etc.) next to the idea of corporeal semantics. In the 
corporeal paradigm, representation is embodied, produced and processed by the whole 
body. As Leman (2010) puts it:  
. . . corporeal semantics can be characterized as (i) multi-modal, because it combines audio, 
movement, and other modalities (visual, haptic, bioparametric) with each other through ac-
tion-perception couplings, (ii) mediated, because it focuses on the mechanisms that transfer 
energetic forms to experiences, or experiences to energetic forms in the physical environment. 
Included in this approach is the fact that the mediator has its own dynamics that may interfere 
in the process, (iii) combined objective/subjective, because the one cannot be studied without 
the other. (p. 52) 
It seems that this idea could be suitable for the embodied approach; the problem seems to 
be, however, that it seems to be not explanatory enough. How is a musical representation of, 
let us say, Bach’s Double Violin Concerto structure created? The answer that it is modeled 
by gestures or bodily movements, even symbolically or metaphorically, seems to be implau-
sible. How do representations differ according to this paradigm? How to model the role of 
representation among the other cognitive functions? The idea of corporeal meaning seems 
to be not explanatorily rich enough to be treated as a good rival for referential, or causal (e.g., 
Ruth Millikan’s teleo-semantical, 1984) theories of representation. By saying that meanings 
are not in the bodies, one does not have to think they are in heads, as Leman assumes:  
Meanings may not be things that exist within the minds of people (or in the brains of people), 
but instead, things that exist as a mediated relationship between mind and energetic forms. 
Meanings cannot be calculated (computed) as resulting from structures only, but as resulting 
from actions, that is, processes that mediate intentions to physical realities (for example through 
sensory motor interactions with physical objects, or through social interactions). (2010, p. 56) 
Meanings might be simply nowhere, as they could be understood as functions used to 
model our cognition. How those functions are realized is a different question. The view 
that meanings are dependent on social constructions (externalism) and that meanings are 
created by action (pragmatism) or the view that meanings are ecologically useful tools (as 
in Milikan’s teleo-semanticism mentioned above), or played a role in evolution (Cross, 
2009) are not new. All of those theories propose interesting accounts in which the refer-
ence to humans and their interaction with their ecological niche is crucial, without, how-
ever, referring to the foggy idea of meanings-in-the-body.  
That human cognition in its actual form would not exist without human bodies is a state-
ment that nowadays only a few (e.g., traditional functionalists) seem to deny. But, as in 
linguistics, musical cognition is based on human-perceived sound  s t r u c t u r e s, 
de⁠scribed by different sciences from acoustics and basic neurobiology to more complex 
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neurosciences, evolutionary sciences and psychology/sociology to philosophy and math-
ematics. All of those disciplines refer to specific models of explanation (classical, causal, 
mechanical) and have their own methodology. The answers proposed to similar questions, 
like the one considering the possibility of music being meaningful, are often different and 
seemingly contradictive. What seems to connect them is the, broadly understood, idea of 
representation. Representational (symbolical) approach has been widely accepted, as it 
offers several possible explanations of how our cognition works in general, while the ideas 
suggesting bodily movements and reactions as the main bearer of representations seems 
to fail to explain how those representations function in our mental architecture. And the 
explanation of the functioning, or at least modeling, of the mental architecture seems to 
be one of the main goals of cognitive science.  
On the other hand, without understanding how our body shapes our cognition, we would 
be left on the empty formal ground of structures and forms. Studies in developmental lin-
guistics or psychological studies of subjects with motor impairment (Oudgenoeg-Paz & 
Rivière, 2014), have shown strong correlations (both top-down and bottom up) between 
body action and cognition.  
It is not especially controversial anymore that (at least to some extent) the body shapes the 
mind, and it is especially clear in the field of music perception. Obviously, playing music, 
dancing or listening to music requires a body as a primal tool for achieving musical expe-
rience, and the role of embodied musical aesthetics could be seen as describing the part 
played by the body in this experience. Some further steps have been made (Matyja, 2015) 
to deal with certain methodological obstacles the embodied paradigm meets, by suggesting 
that Bechtel’s mechanical model of explanation could be incorporated in the embodied mu-
sic cognition paradigm. While the mechanical model of explanation is widely and often 
successfully used in cognitive sciences, the question of how such mechanistic explanation 
would work when we take the “body and its environment” into account still awaits an an-
swer. It just seems that referring to the body as an explanatory tool in the research aiming to 
describe and explain some higher cognitive human functions, like the musical representation 
here, seems to be—until now—unsuccessful. Some of the “classical” empirical approaches, 
as in cognitive neuroscience of music, provide more efficient models (mostly due to their 
representational and functional characteristics) to explain the riddle of musical meaning. 
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